"A CITY WITHOUT JEWS"

URBAN REDEMPTION AND THE NAZI CITY

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I take my title "A City Without Jews" from a 1924 novel by the Austrian Hugo Bettauer. Imagine the reader in 1924 who casually glances at Bettauer's title; how does she interpret the words "a city without Jews"? As a description of an existing city (a city where there are no Jews), or as kind of fantasy, as the utopia of the anti-Semite (an imagined city without Jews)? It's this tension within the title — between a really existing city and a fantasy city — that suggested another tension to me, one developed in much of the Nazi propaganda prior to 1933 which discussed Berlin: The tension between a perception and a desire, between a city which the Nazis imagined as victimized by "Jewish" influences and interests, and that city's anticipated liberation from the "Jews." According to this thinking, Berlin's urban "problem" was essentially a social problem, one which could be solved through social policies. Even before deportations began, measures enacted by the Nazis to restrict Jews' access to public spaces like pools, parks, entertainments, and even certain districts would effectively reconstitute urban publics thought to be "un-German."[1]

Yet the evidence of the Neugestaltung itself — Nazi plans to "reorganize" over two dozen major German cities — demonstrates that the "problem" with Germany's urban spaces was at the same time an architectural problem.[2] The Neugestaltung's primary task would be to correct an imbalance in the relation of public to private buildings. But could this architectural problem find a purely architectural solution? How did the Nazis address the status of private architecture, whose prominence, Hitler believed, had worked to marginalize "community monuments"? This paper explores the Neugestaltung's contradictory attitude toward the private realm and private buildings and uses the example of the department store (as an instance of private architecture) to illustrate the convergence of Nazi thinking about urban space and Nazi anti-semitism.

I begin with 1924 and *Mein Kampf* . Here, in a chapter entitled "Causes of the Collapse," Adolf Hitler offers one of his most sustained reflections on the general problem of German cities: "In the nineteenth century our cities began more and more to lose the character of cultural sites and to descend to the level of mere human settlements."[3] Cities had become, he writes, "masses of apartments and tenements, and nothing more."[4] In other words, German cities resembled dwellings more and more and museums less and less. That this problem is really a problem of the relative significance of public and private structures within cities becomes clearer later in the passage:

> *Our big cities of today possess no monuments dominating the city picture, which might somehow be regarded as symbols of the whole epoch. This was true in the cities of antiquity, since nearly every one possessed a special monument in which it took pride. The characteristic aspect of the ancient city did not lie in private buildings, but in the community monuments which seemed made, not for the moment, but for eternity, because they were intended to reflect, not the wealth of an individual owner, but the greatness and wealth of the community. Thus arose monuments which were very well suited to unite the individual inhabitant with his city.... For what the ancient had before his eyes was less the humble houses of private owners than the magnificent edifices of the whole community. Compared to them the dwelling house sank to the level of an insignificant object of secondary importance.*[5]

The move within this passage is twofold. First, by referring to an ancient model, Hitler sets up his discussion of the present in which he notes how "truly deplorable the relation between state buildings and private buildings has become today!"[6] Second, he constructs a particular public/private dichotomy: on the one hand, community monuments/made for eternity/reflecting the greatness and wealth of the community, on the other, private buildings/built for the moment/displaying the wealth of an individual owner. Significantly, the "deplorable relation" he sees between public and private structures finds anti-Semitic expression; Hitler writes: "If the fate of Rome should strike Berlin, future generations would some day admire the department stores of a few Jews as the mightiest works of our era and the hotels of a few corporations as the characteristic expression of the culture of our times."[7] In other words, Berlin exemplifies a reversal of values, a "world upside down," in which private buildings — symbols of impermanence, individualism, materialism — assume the kind of dominance normally reserved for the architectural

embodiments of the state.

If we take this passage from *Mein Kampf* — this call to create community monuments — as a blueprint for Hitler's thoughts about Berlin's Neugestaltung, Speer's plans for that city come as no surprise: One simply erects public buildings of proportions so massive as to physically destroy what Hitler calls the "miserable discrepancy" between structures of the Reich and those of finance and commerce. In general, the secondary literature on Nazi architecture interprets the Neugestaltung through this outcome; it focuses only on the regime's monumental and public structures, interpreting the problem of the relation between public and private as exclusively a matter of exhortation, an incitement to invest in, indeed inflate, the public. In my opinion, however, such accounts of the Neugestaltung are deficient in several respects, but above all for the fact that they fail to address how this central problem of the Neugestaltung — the "miserable discrepancy" — would be resolved through the *other* half of the dichotomy.[8] By this I mean, what happens to private architecture and its set of antithetical values, which Hitler had denounced in 1924 within his description of a "declining culture and our general collapse"?[9]

Hitler's thoughts on architecture and city planning in *Mein Kampf* raise three important questions: What significance and function would private space hold for a concept of urban space serviceable to National Socialism? What would its relationship be to public space and architecture? And finally, what position would the Jews occupy vis-a-vis these relationships? In what follows, I attempt to answer these questions using plans and statements about Berlin's Neugestaltung, particularly its showpiece "North-South Axis."

Berlin's atypical nature — as capital of the Reich and therefore the most important example of representative space — meant that renegotiations of the public/private relationship assumed a greater critical import here than elsewhere, not least of which because Berlin's status as capital had made this "miserable discrepancy" and the dominance of interests coded as private or Jewish appear all the more pronounced. Indeed doubts about Berlin worthiness — its ability to serve as the Reich's leading city — had surfaced in several forms, from claims that the "spirit of Berlin" stood opposed to the "spirit of Germany,"[10] to Hitler's assertion in 1937 that Berlin, while easily Germany's Hauptstadt (capital) in terms of population, could not be considered so when one measured its "cultural and monumental significance and production" against that of other German cities.[11]

So, amidst these questions about Berlin's representativeness, the evidence presented by the North-South Axis is rather surprising: the Axis appears to be as much a showcase for private buildings as for public buildings.[12] Speer writes:

> *We had, of course, recognized that lining the new avenue solely with public buildings would lead to a certain lifelessness and had therefore reserved two-thirds of the length of the street for private buildings. ... We had no wish for an avenue consisting solely of ministries. A luxurious movie house for premieres, another cinema for the masses accommodating two thousand persons, a new opera house, three theaters, a new concert hall, a building for congresses, the so-called House of the Nations, a hotel of twenty-one stories, variety theaters, mass and luxury restaurants, and even an indoor swimming pool, built in Roman style and as large as the baths of Imperial Rome, were deliberately included in the plans with the idea of bringing urban life into the new avenue. There were to be quiet interior courtyards with colonnades and small luxury shops set apart from the noise of the street and inviting strollers.*[13]

Speer's passage tells us a few things: first, the Axis, which would constitute Berlin's new center, would be a mixed use space (this is perhaps more true of the southern end of the central portion of the Axis, where a large number of new housing units were to have been created); second, that something called "urban life" was desirable for this space, and third, that at that time Speer believed one introduced urban life through an infusion of private buildings.[14] What then of the "deplorable ... relation between state buildings and private buildings"?[15]

One can't simply conclude that arguments about the influence of private buildings had been rendered obsolete by the Nazi takeover; as late as 1943 one still finds denunciations of the role of private structures, as in this passage from a promotional book about the Neugestaltung: "As long as department stores, bazaars, hotels, office buildings in the form of skyscrapers and so forth — as the most prominent sights — constitute the characteristic features of our present-day metropolises, both art and real culture are out of the question. ... Unfortunately in the bourgeois age, the architectural design of public life was suppressed for the benefit of the transactions of private-capitalistic business life."[16] The passage is, in fact, a quotation from a 1935 speech by Adolf Hitler (and as such, a rehashing of familiar themes) but what is the status of its citation — particularly its portrayal of the private interests behind these structures as antagonists — at a time when plans for the North-South Axis and its office buildings, luxurious stores, and hotel towers were well in place?

The seemingly contradictory desire to integrate (as opposed to tolerate) private structures into Berlin's new urban concept suggests that the Neugestaltung resolved the problem of the public/private relationship not through the will to overscaled public monuments alone, but also, more broadly, through a reinscription of the public/private architecture relationship. By placing private architecture under a different sign, the National Socialists could give prominent place to it in Berlin, even private architecture of massive proportions. Clues as to the strategies of this reinscription can be found primarily among the major documents of National Socialist architectural propaganda, which point to three related processes: Control (dictating the "place" of private architecture); alignment (re-fashioning private architecture in the manner of public architecture; allowing private architecture to serve a representative function); and redefinition (redeeming private architecture by splitting or presenting alternative visions of the private;

constructing an opposition between a positive or serviceable private and a negative or destructive private).

Of these strategies described within the propaganda, the assertion of control was perhaps the most significant: the Neugestaltung was established through decree, and its foundation in law would demonstrate the state's architectural will.[17] Above all, the state claims the authority to plan, and in doing so distinguishes itself from the weak, bourgeois state it replaces: no longer would "cities expand planlessly."[18] Planning would be synonymous with control insofar as it enabled the state to put private architecture in its "place," both literally and figuratively. In the first instance, the state, through the urban planning offices created by the Neugestaltung, fixes the location of private buildings.[19] As Speer writes of Berlin's North-South Axis: "Thus in the future large private constructions will no longer arise, as they had before, in any place they wish.[20] Private buildings now occupy the position assigned to them in an urban center whose effects were calculated to the highest degree.

Secondly, as in the case of the North-South Axis, the state guarantees the significance or impression of its private buildings through the uniform (*einheitlich*) appearance of the avenue in which these structures participate, a uniformity ensured by Speer's authority to assign architects and to enforce standardized height requirements on buildings and storefronts. [21] According to Hans Stephan of Berlin's General Building Inspector's Office, the Axis' business and administration buildings would "arise from well weighed out plans."[22]

What did the influence of planning mean? That no private building would upstage the structures of the Reich. But this fact had already been demonstrated in the most obvious fashion by the very presence of these private buildings, which included administration buildings for Allianz Insurance, IG Farben, and AEG (the electrical company) in plans for the North-South Axis itself, that is along what was considered the focus of the "public and social life of the Weltstadt."[23] Had the state not been secure in its estimation of their effects, it's unlikely that it would have permitted them to arise here. But this inclusion nevertheless demands explanation. Why not control private influence by making it virtually invisible?

The answer to this question brings me to the state's second strategy of reinscription: Alignment, or the re-fashioning of the North-South Axis' private architecture in the manner of public architecture. While private structures would never necessarily be considered "community architecture" — that is, as the embodiments of the state — they could nevertheless assume a *representative* function (much in the way that public architecture would) as edifices which could transmit the worth and values of the German people. How did this work? We know from his memoirs that Speer believed private buildings were necessary in order to create urban life on the Axis, and in the announcement of Berlin's Neugestaltung in the *Deutsches Nachrichtenburo* Speer gives some indication of how this would happen: "The large scale electric signs of private buildings [and] the lighting and emissions from public buildings will be a glistening frame for the expected heavy traffic here, so that here the avenue will present an extraordinarily animated metropolitan picture."[24] Similarly, one of the most significant publications dealing exclusively with Berlin's Neugestaltung, Hans Stephan's pamphlet "Die Baukunst im Dritten Reich," claimed that enormous electric advertising, along with theatres, a cinema for premieres (which the film concern Ufa would build), and coffee houses, would "fill the street with colorful life."[25] Insofar as urban life was valued and seen as desirable (which it could now be under the influence of the Neugestaltung) private buildings contributed to a common good. In this respect, the presence of electric signage (which Speer tells us would be employed profusely) deserves further attention. These electric signs were forms of advertising, and, as the National Socialist campaign against department stores had taught, the attractions of suggestive advertising often mystified, concealing the "healthy" relationship between a commodity and its value. [26] But here on the Axis, what would otherwise be breaches in Nazi policy find themselves mended through the strategy of realignment. Electric signage and commercialism serve the state. The ground floors of the business and administration buildings lining the Axis had been designed to "shelter a continuous chain of the most elegant shops."[27] As Speer writes: "The whole avenue was also conceived by Hitler and me as a continuous sales display of German goods which would exert a special attraction upon foreigners."[28] Commercial spaces, like monumental architecture, would inspire awe in German achievements.

But beyond their contribution to something called "urban life," private buildings would also assume a more authoritarian function. Here Speer speaks of the North-South Axis:

> *For not only the huge public buildings will line the great street, the even larger new buildings of private building owners will also be assigned a spot at this stage, which should yet strengthen the dominating (beherrschende) effect of Berlin's new urban center. Thus in the future large private constructions will no longer stand, as they had in the past, in any spot they wish in the city's municipal area, but rather, in the same manner as the large public constructions, through a well-planned, fixed location take an active party in the new city crown, which dominates (beherrscht) the whole, great metropolitan municipal area.*[29]

Here the private works *in conjunction with* the public. Through its assigned location along the Axis, it finds its assigned role: to contribute to the power or dominating effect of this new urban center. But how would private buildings enhance the effects, the commanding impression, already created by the public buildings there? Through the suggestion that the power behind them — the power of private interests — was in some way no longer serving merely its *own interests* but serving the state, and ultimately, the volkisch community, along with commercialism and consumption.

But if indeed impressive private architecture along the North-South Axis, and the interests it represented, would function to consolidate the position of the urban

center with its *public* buildings, why do propaganda pieces written by Hans Stephan and Rudolf Wolters (both of whom were department heads in the Planning Authority of Speer's General Building Inspector's Office) insist upon relating the story of a bad urban and architectural past determined by private profit? Why do we find descriptions which indicate the prominent place that would be given to privately-owned structures, side-by-side with negative claims about the place of private architecture? So that, for example, six years after the Neugestaltung had been inaugurated through decree Wolters still needs to write that its architectural focal points would be of such dimension that they would "dominate every private building." This apparent contradiction reveals the third strategy of reinscription, a strategy more immediately rooted in the Reich's economic and social policies: National Socialism splits the concept of the private into two, into, crudely, a redeemed or serviceable private realm (to which the "realigned" private architecture I've described would belong) and a denigrated or egoistic private realm, which it links with the Jews.

But in order to understand how this split occurs, one needs to return to the "bad past" that Nazi architectural plans claimed to remedy. According to Stephan and Wolters, the problem of private architecture's dominance cannot be separated from the problem of a weak state and its inability to respond proactively to the general confusion introduced by industrialization. Both authors relate the same history: beginning in the late 19th century, cities began to expand without plan. Materialist thinking prevailed, the state lost any sense of its architectural task, and structures were no longer built for eternity. In this bourgeois age, "Trade and industry and private capital soared beyond measure. These obtained a power, which up to that time the state and sovereigns held. The state itself no longer possessed any positive leadership."[30]

Under National Socialism the state reasserts itself; it corrects a "miserable discrepancy" by reclaiming the authority that appears to rightfully or naturally belong to it. Its task vis-a-vis capital was, as Hitler writes: "to make certain that capital remain the handmaiden of the state and not fancy itself the mistress of the nation.[31] Making capital the handmaiden of the state would only be possible, Hitler explains, when this state understood a distinction articulated most forcefully by party ideologue and influential Nazi urban planner Gottfried Feder, the distinction between "pure capital as the end result of productive labor and a capital whose existence and essence rests exclusively on speculation."[32] But what was at stake in this opposition between industrial capital and finance capital was more than mere economics; in Feder's language, this was a distinction between "creative versus parasitic capital."[33] The former was "not at all in conflict with the interest of the totality," the latter, as the pages of *Mein Kampf* make clear, was embodied by the figure of the Jew.[34]

The existence of this split, between private activity and profits that were valued (those declared to be compatible with the Volk) and those which were denigrated (because seen to be opposed to the Volk), reveals a great deal about the Nazis' complex attitude toward private architecture. In the first instance, the split disguises any contradictions in the Nazi stance towards private architecture; if its propaganda speaks out of both sides of its mouth, vilifying at one moment and embracing in the next, it does so because it claims to speak about *two very different kinds of private architecture*. At the same time, the split demonstrates that not every instance of private architecture would or could be reinscribed for a "reorganized" Berlin. This was the case with the department store. Here was the denigrated private which the Nazis proved unable to place under a different sign.

Hitler, it should be remembered, had already linked department stores with Jews in *Mein Kampf*, simultaneously disparaging Jews and the weak liberal-republican state that had allowed department stores as private expressions to assume such dominance within the urban landscape. Similarly, Gottfried Feder's critique of the department store made use of anti-Semitism and echoed his theory of parasitic capital. After describing department stores as places belonging to "nobody but Jews," Feder continued, "We also see in these [department stores] a specific organizational form of the interest-capital idea, which doesn't serve actual commodity needs, but instead, mainly yields gigantic profits for department store shareholders."[35]

But after 1933, when this anti-department store campaign began to work against the state's economic interests and the Nazis wished to reverse the effects of this propaganda and reinscribe the meaning of the department store, the chain of associations which they had set up (department stores-Jews-finance capital) proved to potent to be undone.

Department stores might have been the perfect candidates for realignment: Fearing the economic repercussions if department stores collapsed, the state had invested significant capital in them (in some cases, in the form of credit help from Reich banks to Jewish-owned department stores like the Hermann Tietz Konzern, in others, by becoming major shareholders: Reich banks would own more than 50 percent of the share capital for the Karstadt chain).[36] But department stores could not be redeemed. The reason is perhaps best indicated by this quote from *Der Sturmer*: "Trash remains trash, whether Tietz or Karstadt or Woolworth or any other Jew offers it."[37] No matter that neither Karstadt nor Woolworth's was Jewish-owned; the Nazis could not convince local leadership that department stores were not "Jewish." Even after the majority of Jewish-owned businesses had been "Aryanized," Goering still needed to persuade civil servants against further department store boycotts explaining that these stores could no longer be simply equated with "Jewish management." His warning to them that anti-department store actions jeopardized *Reich* capital reveals that black-and-white distinctions like the creative/parasitic capital opposition were only tenable in the regime's propaganda; that department stores remained "Jewish" in the public's imagination reveals that this opposition derived its force from anti-Semitism. Department stores survived the Third Reich in a kind of limbo: The state refused to let them go under, at the same time it refused to publicly support what had become an unpopular institution.

When I began to consider the role of private buildings along the North-South Axis and this matter of realignment — the process through which private space becomes representative — I wondered, why didn't, or why couldn't, the Nazis put a department store, for example, on the Axis? In this respect, we might think about the department store as a kind of limit, as an inassimilable instance of private architecture. The North-South Axis could have its own commercial character, could even promote consumerism using electric lighting that would, in its own right, be monumental, but it couldn't permit what the Nazi propaganda had once repeatedly called a "Jewish invention." The impossibility of its inclusion here testifies to the existence of this denigrated private, which survives as a kind of remainder. Just as the Jews, as outsiders to the volkisch community, represented for the Nazis the remainder of a civil society that had once existed distinct from the state (Jews were regarded as agitators for individual or "private" rights against the state), so to the department store — which the Nazis would have rather eliminated but which they could not — also represented a remainder. For the Nazis, the department store was the urban remnant of the "Jew."

And so I arrive, at last, at this idea of a "City Without Jews." The example of the department store — that is, the inadmissability of a "Jewish invention" on the North-South Axis and the impossibility of its realignment — helps one see that the problem with German cities and particularly with Berlin, the problem which presented itself to the Nazis as a "miserable discrepancy" within the public/private architecture relationship, could take the form of a problem to be solved in the same way that the Nazis' "Jewish question" was solved through the elimination of Jews. Of course, understanding the problem in this way means using the department store, an institution and building form identified as "Jewish," as a metaphor for "the Jewish body." While the metaphor is perhaps a simple one, it is nevertheless productive; it points the way to the Nazis' other concern for Berlin: Its desire to reconstitute an urban public which had been seen as overwhelmingly "Jewish" and "foreign," its desire to make the public itself representative. The figure of the department store represents a way of thinking about the convergence of Berlin's architectural solutions and its social solutions, a way of thinking about how Berlin's redemption, its path to becoming — in Hitler's words — "a truly worthy capital of the ... German Reich" depended not only upon its truly monumental building projects, but upon it becoming a "city without Jews."[38]

NOTES

[1] See for example Joseph Goebbels' "Around the Gedächtniskirche" (in ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg, *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 560-562 in which the author describes a West Berlin animated by the "spirit of the asphalt democracy," whose round-the-clock inhabitants are not the "national elite" but "only the Israelites." The true Berlin, Goebbels tells us, lies elsewhere, "lurking, ready to pounce ... And this day will demolish the abodes of corruption all around the Gedächtniskirche; it will transform them and give them over to a risen people."

[2] Foremost among them Berlin, Munich, Nurnberg, Hamburg, and Linz. The Neugestaltung, which would give these and other cities new centers, was enacted as a decree (Gesetz über die Neugestaltung Deutscher Städte) in 1937.

[3] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* , trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), p. 263.

[4] Ibid., 263.

[5] Ibid., 264.

[6] Ibid., 265.

[7] Ibid., 265.

[8] At the same time, these accounts tend to isolate these structures as discrete architectural moments, independent of any context; the "contextualization" that these accounts do provide consists in the citation of statistics demonstrating the enormity of these structures and the assertion that they would, in any case, overwhelm all "context." This route, however, forecloses any consideration of the kind of ideas the Nazis might have had about context.

[9] Hitler, op. cit., 266.

[10] Ludwig Finck, "The Spirit of Berlin," in ed. Kaes, Jay, Dimendberg , op. cit., pp. 414-415.

[11] Quoted in Hans Stephan, *Die Baukunst im Dritten Reich: insbesondere die Umgestaltung der Reichshauptstaft* (Berlin: Juner und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1939), p. 13. Stephan uses this quote to justify the Neugestaltung: the architectural appearance of Berlin had up until that point not corresonded to its role as capital of the Reich. This of course would now be changed.

[12] As Speer tells us, he was obliged to enlist Hitler's help to preserve the character he imagined for the boulevard, even if this meant selecting a "business building" for a particular location over a "governement agency." Robert Ley's Labor Front had been particularly aggressive in its attempts to purchase lots along the Axis. See Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* , trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Avon Books, 1970), pp. 189, 199.

[13] Ibid., p. 189.

[14] One needs to read through the whole passage to Speer's admission of the avenue's failures to understand that the lifelessness he wished to avoid was the absence of *urban* life: "Whenever, nowadays, I look through the plans and photos of the models , even these varied parts of the avenue strike me as lifeless and regimented.... The entire conception was stamped by a monumental rigidity that would have counteracted all our efforts to introduce urban life into this avenue." (Ibid., 189.) It should be noted that not all the structures which Speer mentions here would indeed be private buildings: the largest of the cinemas, the opera house, and the theatres, for example, would be undertaken by Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry and were to have been located in its immediate proximity.

[15] Hitler, op. cit., 265.

[16] Rudolf Wolters, *Neue Deutsche Baukunst* (Prague: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1943,) p. 9.

[17] Stephan, op. cit., pp. 6-8. No longer would "regulations and laws limp behind and try to mend the damage."

[18] Wolters, op. cit., 8.

[19] Such as the General Building Inspector's Office for Berlin, headed by Albert Speer.

[20] "Neuplanung der Reichshauptstadt" (January 1939), reproduced in ed. Anna Teut, *Architektur im Dritten Reich 1933-1945* (Frankfurt a. Main: Verlag Ullstein, 1967). p. 199.

[21] Speer, op. cit., pp.191, 202.

[22] Stephan, op. cit., p. 18.

[23] Ibid., p. 18.

[24] *Deutsches Nachrichtenburo* (January 27, 1938), reproduced in ed. Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies, Josef Henke, *Hitlers Städte: Baupolitik im Dritten Reich* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1978), pp. 134-141.

[25] Stephan, op. cit., p.18.

[26] Heinrich Uhlig, *Die Warenhäuser im Dritten Reich* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956), p. 14.

[27] Stephan, op. cit., p. 18.

[28] Speer, op. cit., p. 189.

[29] Teut, op.cit., p. 199.

[30] Wolters, op. cit. p. 8.

[31] Hitler, op. cit., p. 209.

[32] Ibid.

[33] "Schaffendes gegen raffendes Kapital." From Feder's *Kampf gegen Hochfinanz* (Munich, 1933), quoted in Jeffrey Herf, *Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 190. As Herf writes: "Creative capital was a source of utility, employment and technologocal advance, whereas parasitic capital drained national resources for the benefit of a smaller number of international financiers." (Ibid., p. 190).

[34] Gottfried Feder quoted in Herf, op. cit., p. 190.

[35] Gottfried Feder, from "Das Programm der NSDAP und seine weltanschaulichen Grundlagen" (Murnau, 1929), reproduced in Uhlig, op. cit., pp. 191-192

[36] Peter Stürzebecker, *Das Berliner Warenhaus. Bautypus, Element der Stadtorganisation, Raumsphäre der Warenwelt* (Berlin: Archibook-Verlag. 1979), p. 43.

[37] Quoted in Uhlig, op. cit., p. 35.

[38] Hitler, speaking on the occasion of Berlin's 700th anniversary.